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Abstract
While it is relatively easy to start an online advertising campaign, obtaining
a high Key Performance Indicator (KPI) can be challenging. A large body
of work on this subject has already been performed and platforms known as
DSPs are available on the market that deal with such an optimization. From
the advertiser’s point of view, each DSP is a different black box, with its pros
and cons, that needs to be configured. In order to take advantage of the pros
of every DSP, advertisers are well-advised to use a combination of them when
setting up their campaigns. In this paper, we propose an algorithm for advertis-
ers to add an optimization layer on top of DSPs. The algorithm we introduce,
called skott, maximizes the chosen KPI by optimally configuring the DSPs
and putting them in competition with each other. skott is a highly specialized
iterative algorithm loosely based on gradient descent that is made up of three
independent sub-routines, each dealing with a different problem: partitioning
the budget, setting the desired average bid, and preventing under-delivery. In
particular, one of the novelties of our approach lies in our taking the perspective
of the advertisers rather than the DSPs. Synthetic market data is used to eval-
uate the efficiency of skott against other state-of-the-art approaches adapted
from similar problems. The results illustrate the benefits of our proposals, which
greatly outperforms the other methods.
Keywords: Keywords: Demand Side Platform (DSP), Online Advertising,
Gradient Descent, Optimization, Real Time Bidding (RTB)
1. Introduction
Online advertising is a vast market, worth several billion USD per year [13].
It is easy to understand the importance of optimization in such a market: every
percent of increase in efficiency has a value in the order of millions of USD. From
the advertiser’s point of view, however, optimization is often very difficult due to
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the constraints imposed by the structure of the ecosystem of online advertising.
Let us see why.
There are currently two main paradigms in the market: sponsored search
and Real-Time Bidding (RTB) auctions.
Sponsored search, the main source of revenues for search engines, consists
in showing relevant ads whenever a user inputs a query. For example, typing
“football shoes” in the search bar will provide the user with several links to
online shops selling sports apparel. In order to appear amongst the sponsored
links, an advertiser must place a bid on the queries or keywords to which it
wants to be connected. Typically, advertisers pay if and only if their sponsored
link is clicked on; this creates a collaborative effort between search engine and
advertiser to show the most promising ad. Sponsored search has been the subject
of lots of research papers over the years, dealing with, for example, budget
optimization [10, 14] and click-through rate prediction [24, 31].
The RTB paradigm, which is the focus of our optimization work, is inher-
ently different. In this paradigm, advertisers participate in auctions to buy the
available space on a website. The winning advertiser is allowed to display its
ad (in the technical jargon, it has bought an “impression”). Unlike sponsored
search, advertisers pay for all impressions they buy, even if they don’t “gener-
ate a click”, i.e., users don’t click on them to be redirected to the advertiser’s
page. This changes everything as it removes any interest for the auctioneer to
find an ad that is a good match to the current inventory, a task that is now
completely left to the advertisers. As a consequence of these differences, the
optimization results obtained in sponsored search are not directly applicable to
RTB campaigns.
As we already mentioned, this optimization process is made difficult by the
very structure of the market that, in its simplest approximation, looks like
this (cf. Fig. 1): The central entity is the AdExchange, whose job is to run
real-time bidding auctions and assign every available inventory (i.e., the screen
space on which the advertising should be published) to its corresponding winning
advertiser; On one side of AdExchanges there are Supply Side Platforms (SSPs),
which provide the inventory and are in direct contact with the publishers (e.g.,
the owner of a web page); On the other side, the one that interests us the most,
there are Demand Side Platforms (DSPs): they bid on the available inventory
on behalf of the advertisers according to the advertisers’ necessities. Each step
of this chain brings its own constraints and optimizations: for example, a DSP
might work only with certain AdExchanges, effectively limiting the amount of
inventory available to the advertiser, but it also might offer better performances
on some particular indicators due to internal optimization algorithms.
It is easy for an advertiser to set up a campaign with a DSP and monitor
its effectiveness by calculating certain Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). On
the flip side, however, the use of a DSP prevents the advertiser from directly
determining the bid on each individual auction, only allowing it to fix some
average parameters to associate with larger sets of impressions. We call each
of these abstract entities made of a set of impressions and its corresponding
parameters a media object. Each media object can almost be treated as a
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separate entity with its own associated budget that can change over time, the
only global constraint being that the total budget of the campaign is fixed.
A single media object makes the optimization easy to handle but inefficient
because it treats all impressions in the same way, bidding roughly the same
amount of money for all impressions and showing the same advertising to all
users. A correct choice of the parameters of the media objects can, therefore,
have a huge impact on the global optimization of the campaign.
But this setup leaves advertisers with many questions: What is the most
appropriate DSP to use amongst the many available on the market? How to
parametrize it? How much budget to assign to each of its media objects? These
questions are often answered by human experts that base their decisions on
past experience, intuition, and some off-line data analysis. However, there is
no guarantee that the goals set by the experts are reachable, nor that they are
optimal.
In recent decades, researchers have focused mainly on market models [6, 12,
18, 21, 29] and bidding algorithms for DSPs [5, 30, 7, 11, 19, 23]. However, to the
best of our knowledge, no paper tackles the optimal management of a campaign
from the point of view of an advertiser that uses a DSP. The new constraints that
come with such a perspective make other optimization algorithms studied in the
literature difficult to compare with ours. For example, our need to partition the
budget arises from the necessity to work with media objects: when an impression
arrives that is a good fit to a particular media object, we need to be sure that
the media object has a sufficient budget to spend. This problem does not exist
when one can decide how much money to spend on a single impression basis,
with the only constraint of the total campaign budget.
The main contribution of this paper is the skott algorithm, that solves this
understudied problem: skott automatically handles advertising campaigns,
finding the best parameters to put inside each DSP in order to maximize the
performance; it also allows the contemporary use of different DSPs that are put
in competition to further increase the performance. Therefore, not only it gives
a recipe to fully take advantage of any single DSP, but it also adds a new layer of
optimization on top of them. The algorithm reacts quickly to market variations
and scales linearly with respect to the number of media objects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss
a few algorithms that deal with a similar problem and have been an inspiration
Ad ExchangesDSPs SSPs
skott
Advertiser
RTB
Auctions
Publisher
Web User
Figure 1: A simple, approximate representation of the RTB auctions market structure. The
proposed algorithm, skott, would work as an interface between advertisers and DSPs.
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for our work. In Section 3 we state the problem at hand and our goals. Sections
4, 5, and 6 deal with the three independent sub-routines that compose skott.
The conducted experiments and results obtained are discussed in Section 7.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 8. Finally, appendices give details on the
creation of the synthetic market data, the algorithms we chose for comparison
of the results, and the technical part of the implementation.
2. Related work
The problem of how to spend a budget in order to maximize the profit during
an advertising campaign has never been studied, to the best of our knowledge,
from the point of view of an advertiser using DSPs. Nevertheless, there are many
works in the literature that are relevant because they try to solve a similar
problem. We will cite and discuss some of them in this section, mainly to
highlight what is the difference in our approach.
In [10] the authors propose to use a randomized uniform strategy for choosing
how much to bid on every keyword in a sponsored search. That could be applied
to our problem of Real-Time Bidding auctions through the use of DSPs problem
by analogy, associating every keyword with a different media object. (We refer
to the introduction and to the problem statement for the definition of media
objects.) However, their model assumes a complete knowledge of the bidding
landscape, that is, the probability distribution of the winning bids for each
impression. This is information that advertisers don’t have in the case of RTB
auctions through DSPs. Also, the model in [10] requires the bidding landscape
to be static, a hypothesis that we don’t require.
The problem of collecting the largest possible reward of an advertising cam-
paign with a constraint on the budget can be also written in the linear pro-
gramming formalism. This is done, for example, in [5]. There, however, the
authors: 1. take the point of view of a DSP, and 2. try to optimize the revenue
of publishers and not of advertisers. In particular, they assign each piece of
inventory to a different advertising campaign assuming that the total Cost Per
Click (CPC) of each campaign is fixed. This last point is clearly not the case
when we look at it from the advertiser’s side because, as we said, we consider
the case where advertisers pay for the inventory they buy regardless of it being
clicked on. This implies that the CPC is then determined by the ratio between
the average cost per impression and the click-through ratio of a media object,
therefore it’s not constant, as we will thoroughly see when we analyze the skott
algorithm.
A similar work, explicitly based on [5], is [19], where a linear programming
algorithm is proposed for DSPs wanting to maximize their revenues. Besides the
different perspective, the authors assume a fixed Click-Through Rate (CTR),
known in advance. This is not required in our approach, where we infer the CTR
from market data in real time and the only assumption we make on its analytical
form is that it varies slowly with the bid. A linear programming approach
inspired by these works will be tested against skott in the simulations.
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A third approach to the problem is due to reinforcement learning. In this
case, the bidder is considered as an agent that learns how much to bid for every
individual auction. To direct its choice, it is aware of the budget constraints,
the goals of the campaign, and all context information from the impression it is
trying to buy. This approach is studied for example in [4] where, due to the huge
size of the space of possible actions to take, the authors help the decision process
by using a model-based approach. This approach is extremely interesting but
ineffective in our case for two main reasons: first of all, the constraints under
which we work prevent us from accessing individual auctions; and, secondly, we
obtain information not in real time but in batches that come in at larger time
scales (roughly an hour). Nevertheless, the reinforcement learning approach is
tested against skott in the simulations, adapting it to allocate the budget to
the different media objects according to their results.
3. Problem statement
As stated in the introduction, advertisers can participate in RTB auctions
by using a DSP. Typically, several DSPs are employed in order to increase the
amount of people reached and better respond to business necessities. Each DSP
needs to be configured. The details of the configuration might differ from DSP
to DSP, but there is a central core of abstraction that is common to all of them.
We call it a media object : it is a set of instructions given by the advertisers,
some of which are qualitative and set once and for all at instantiation while
others are quantitative and can be changed at any moment. An example of the
former is the creative associated to the media object, i.e., the actual advertising
being shown. Another example of qualitative instructions are the filters on
incoming auctions that select on which impressions to place a bid depending on
the user and inventory characteristics. The hourly budget and the base bid for
the auctions, instead, belong to the latter. It is important to note that the media
object is the most precise layer of abstraction that is accessible to advertisers.
The only influence that they can have on the auctions, and therefore their only
possibility for optimization, lies in the parameters of the media objects.
We consider an advertising campaign to be defined by: a total budget B,
a start date, an end date, a desired spend profile (i.e., the amount of total
money spent at any moment during the campaign), and a collection of K media
objects spread across different DSPs. The typical duration for a campaign is
of the order of a few weeks up to a few months, while the value of K depends
heavily on the campaign and can vary from as few as 1 to over 100 000.
During the campaign lifetime, the advertiser receives information on the be-
havior of every media object from the different DSPs. Each data point contains
hourly information on the impressions bought, the clicks generated, the money
spent, and possibly other such quantities. Since advertisers don’t have access to
the auctions individually but only through the media objects, they should only
consider the average effect of their optimizations over all impressions. Therefore,
for each media object we take an hourly average of the information received.
In practice, we consider only the Click-Through Rate (CTR, the ratio of clicks
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generated to impressions bought) and Cost-Per-Click (CPC, the ratio of money
spent to clicks generated).
The main goal of our algorithm is to change the media objects parameters in
such a way as to optimize a certain KPI while keeping the desired delivery over
time. In order to demonstrate a practical case, we have chosen to optimize the
total number of clicks generated in the campaign. This is often a valid indicator
to optimize because a user that is interested to purchase something from the
advertiser’s website will probably click directly on the ads, while only a small
fraction of the people that click on the ads will actually make a purchase. The
click is then correlated to the monetary return of the campaign while not being
as rare as an actual purchase.
4. skott: Budget partitioning
skott is an iterative algorithm made up of three subroutines: budget par-
titioning, that rewards high-quality media objects by giving them more money;
base bid setting, that controls the bid of each media object separately with the
goal of increasing the media object’s quality; and pacing control, that prevents
under-delivery. Figure 2 provides a schematic view of the different steps of the
algorithm. The three sub-routines act independently one from another and can
therefore be analyzed in any order. In this section we deal with the budget par-
titioning that defines which percentage of the hourly budget should be allocated
to each media object.
A budget partition is a vector of K weights w. Each element wi represents
which fraction of the total budget is assigned to the corresponding media object
i. A uniform distribution, where all media objects are assigned the same budget,
is represented by the vector u =
(
k−1, k−1, ..., k−1
)
. A greedy distribution is
when a single media object takes all the available budget and is represented by
the vector w
(i)
g = (0, ..., 1, ..., 0).
The ideal algorithm for budget partitioning should:
• return a list of non-negative weights that sum to one at every decision
epoch t,
• optimize a specific KPI (in our case the total number of clicks),
• promptly react to changes in the market, be they sudden or slow.
A very important point to consider when devising the algorithm is that
the data must be bought through winning auctions. Reducing the budget of a
media object well below the expected CPC will result in no clicks being bought,
thereby gaining little to no useful information to estimate the quality of the
media object. An advertiser may spend some time and money to explore the
market randomly, then concentrate their money on the best performing media
objects. This would probably lead, in average, to an increase in the return of
the campaign; but the price to pay is a high risk to get stuck on a sub-optimal
6
Data retrieval
and pre-processing
skott
Base bid setting
Budget partitioning
Pacing control
DSP
market data new instructions
skott algorithm
1: repeat at every hour
2: procedure Retrieve and preprocess data(Appendix C)
3: procedure Budget partitioning(section 4)
4: procedure Base bid setting(section 5)
5: procedure Pacing control(section 6)
6: procedure Finalize
7: send new parameters to the media objects
8: until the campaign is finished
Figure 2: A schematic view of the skott algorithm.
media object. A more dynamic algorithm that keeps exploring over time seems
therefore a more reasonable choice.
There is a balance to strike between exploration and exploitation. The for-
mer is expensive, but mitigates risks and gives a better long-term investment.
The latter increases the short-term reward, but might prove catastrophic over
the long-term, locking the investment on media objects that are ultimately
bound to fail.
4.1. The update rule
The algorithm we propose is a variation of the exponentiated gradient de-
scent method originally proposed in [16]. At each iteration, it updates the weight
vector w in order to optimize the KPI. The algorithm is resumed in Figure 3.
It makes use of the concept of a reward assigned to each media object at every
decision epoch. The reward is a numerical way to estimate how well the media
object did in the epoch. We will see explicitly what it looks like later on.
Given a vector of weights at epoch t, wt = [w1,t, w2,t, ..., wK,t], describing
the distribution of the budget allocated to each of the K media objects during
the t-th hour of the campaign, the algorithm will return a new vector of weights
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Algorithm for budget partitioning
1: function budget partitioning
. t: epoch index
. Ct: clicks obtained by the media objects during t
. Bt: budgets assigned to the media objects before t
. Cˆt−1: cumulative discounted clicks before t (unless t = 0)
. Bˆt−1: cumulative discounted budgets before t (unless t = 0)
. wt: previous repartition of the budget
. u: uniform repartition of the budgets over the media objects
. λt: regularization parameter
. α: learning rate
. γ: discount factor
2: procedure update the discounted quantities
3: if t = 0 then
4: Cˆ0 ← C0
5: Bˆ0 ← B0
6: else
7: Cˆt ← γ Cˆt−1 +Ct
8: Bˆt ← γ Bˆt−1 +Bt
9: procedure calculate gradient of loss function
10: Qt ← Cˆt/Bˆt
11: Q˜t ← Qt/max(Qt)
12: ∇Lt ← −Q˜t + λt · (wt − u)
13: procedure update weights
14: c← exp (−α · ∇Lt)
15: wt+1 ← wt ∗ c/
∑
i wi,tci . ∗: element-wise multiplication
16: return wt+1
Figure 3: Algorithm for budget partitioning
wt+1 that is closer to the minimum of the loss function
Lt(wt) = −
∑
i
Ri(wt) +
λt
2
‖wt − u‖2. (1)
Here, Ri is the reward associated to every media object, λ > 0 is the regulariza-
tion parameter (that can depend on the epoch t), and u is the vector of uniform
distribution with all entries equal to 1/K that we introduced before. The effect
of the first term of the loss function is to favor the repartitions giving larger
reward. The second term, known as the regularization term, requires the repar-
tition w to be close to the uniform distribution u. In other terms, it enforces
the exploration of the market, with the consequences discussed in section 3.
The relative importance of the exploration is therefore given by the numerical
parameter λ that can be set at will. The easy interpretation of this parameter
and its conceptual relevance is an important feature of our algorithm. We will
discuss how to choose it at the end of this section.
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The update rule defined by the exponentiated gradient descent is the follow-
ing:
wt+1 =
wt · exp (−α ∗ ∇Lt(wt))∑
i
[wi,t · exp (−α ∗ ∇iLt(wt))]
, (2)
where α is a real positive parameter known as the learning rate and ∇ indicates
the gradient of a function with respect to the vector of weights w.
4.2. Explicit calculation of the derivative of the loss function
The rest of this section is devoted to write what is the value of ∇Lt(wt)
that is needed to update the weights. To do so, we need to explicitly define
what is the reward and to find its gradient. In general, the reward is given by
the goal of the advertising campaign. As we already mentioned, we will use the
maximization of the number of clicks as an example. The reward is then simply
the number of clicks that a media object obtains during an epoch: R = C.
Its gradient represents the relative change in the number of clicks that a media
object would have generated if we had given it a slightly different budget. This
clearly can not be obtained directly from the market. Our solution is to model
the relation between clicks and budget analytically, derive the gradient, and
then approximate it using the sampled results from the market. In equations,
this reads:
Ri,t(wt) = Qi,t(wi,t) · wi,t; (3)
∇
∑
Ri,t = Qt(wt), (4)
where Qt(wt) is the (unknown) vector of the coefficients that represents concep-
tually the quality of the media objects. Notice that to pass from Eq. 3 to Eq. 4
we have made the assumption that Qt(wt) varies slowly with the weight vector
so that its derivative becomes negligible. This is clearly an approximation, but
a useful one whose price we happily pay.
Since wt = Bt/
∑
iBi,t, where Bt is the vector of budgets associated to each
media object at time t, the quality vector can be written as:
Qt =
Rt
wt
=
∑
i
Bi,t · Ct
Bt
. (5)
Let us notice that Q is quite similar to the vector of inverse CPCs, the two
differences being the (unimportant) global positive multiplicative factor
∑
iBi,t
and the presence at the denominator of Bt instead of St (the budget allocated
instead of the money actually spent during the epoch). This is in accordance
with our intuitive identification of Q with the quality of a media object because
lower CPCs are desirable.
Let us also mention that, since the quality of the media objects depends
on external factors, a rescaling is needed to ensure the relative importance of
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the regularization parameter (hence the uselessness of the global multiplicative
factor
∑
iBi,t). We thus use the rescaled quality Q˜t defined as:
Q˜t =
Qt
max(Qt)
, (6)
which ensures all the elements of the vector to be positive and not larger than
1.
Under these conditions, we can rewrite the derivative of Equation 1 as:
∇Lt(wt) = −Q˜t + λt(wt − u). (7)
4.3. Fighting the noise
Due to the stochastic nature of the data coming from the market, there are
a few corrections to make to the model of the quality vector in order to improve
the precision and the stability of the results.
Let us consider the quality factor as defined in Eq. 5. The problem is that
clicks are extremely rare: A typical CTR is 0.1%, meaning that only one impres-
sion out of a thousand generates a click. However, it is always possible, albeit
rare, that a media object buys a small amount of impressions and generates a
click. This is, of course, just sampling noise due to the very nature of the quanti-
ties we are dealing with. However, if not taken into account, it would dominate
the response of the algorithm and lead to very unstable situations. Even worse,
it could lock the algorithm to put all its money into a single, sub-optimal media
object for a long time. To deal with that we make two corrections.
First of all, we put a hard bound on the gradient between −10/α and +10/α,
α being the learning rate of the gradient descent, to avoid exploding exponen-
tials. This is very simple and straight-forward, but it successfully prevents media
objects with unusually large rewards to take all the budget.
Then, we claim that a better estimation of the value of the quality of a
strategy can be done using a cumulative discounted version of the clicks and
budgets, i.e., a variable that takes into account not only the latest data but also
past data weighted by a discount factor γ:
Qt = Bt · Cˆt
Bˆt
, Cˆt = Ct + γ Cˆt−1, Bˆt = Bt + γ Bˆt−1, (8)
where we call Cˆ the vector of cumulative discounted clicks initialized with the
rule Cˆ0 = C0 (and similarly for the vector of cumulative discounted budgets
Bˆ). Here, γ ∈ [0, 1] controls the importance of past data in the estimation of
the quality of the media object: When γ = 0 we have no memory and Cˆt = Ct
(same for the budgets); we are back in the situation represented by (5). On
the other hand, γ = 1 implies that the data collected at time t0 is considered
relevant for all t > t0 and is never to be forgotten. This is desirable only when
the quality is guaranteed to be constant. Since this is not the case, we use a
γ < 1 to slowly forget data that is no longer relevant. We can fix the exact
value of γ by choosing a time scale for our campaign. If, for example, we want
10
to forget data that is a week old, we can put nd = 7 and solve the equation
γnd = 1/e which yields γ = e−1/nd ≈ 0.87. A first order approximation to this
result can be obtained with γ ≈ 1− 1/nd ≈ 0.86.
4.4. The regularization parameter
We have said that an important feature of our algorithm is the relevance
of the regularization parameter, that decides the trade-off between exploration
and exploitation. Here, we explain what we chose in our simulations and why.
The regularization parameter that we used is
λt = η ·K · γd(t)r , (9)
where η is a positive number that determines the exploration-exploitation trade-
off (in our simulations it is set to 1), K is the number of media objects, γr is
(another) discount factor that determines when should exploitation dominate
over exploration, and d(t) is the number of days that have passed since the
beginning of the campaign.
The interest in rescaling with K comes from the advantage of keeping the
product λt∗u that appears in the gradient of the loss function independent from
the number of media objects. (Remember that u is the uniform distribution,
whose elements are all k−1.) This grants a comparable greediness (measured for
example as the KL-divergence from the uniform distribution, see Equation 28)
when running on campaigns with vastly different number of media objects.
The presence of the term γ
d(t)
r stems instead from the advantage of having
a larger exploration at the beginning of the campaign and a larger exploitation
towards the end, where we want to monetize the knowledge we have acquired.
The numerical value of γr is determined in the same way as for the discount
factor in the quality vector, just using a different time-scale. If, for example,
we want to keep a large exploration for 20 out of the 30 days of the advertising
campaign, we would fix γr = 1− 1/20 = 0.95.
5. skott: Base bid setting
In this section, we present the algorithm that dynamically changes the base
bid of a media object.
The base bid of a media object represents a sort of default value that is
adjusted by the DSP depending on how valuable it deems a certain piece of in-
ventory for said media object. Many DSPs make this adjustment by multiplying
the base bid by a score calculated from data about a specific item of inventory.
Typically, however, the base bid will represent the average bid offered during
the campaign.
Clearly, a high base bid will lead to chronic overbidding. This is indicated
by the fact that the average cost per impression is significantly below the bid,
assuming that the inventory is priced based on the second highest bid (as is
overwhelmingly the case, cf. [28]). Overbidding is very risky because it might
lead to a very large expense on non-valuable impressions if another player in
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the market is making the same mistake. Conversely, a low base bid can cause
the inability of a media object to buy inventory deemed valuable by the DSP,
leading to an under-utilized budget.
Still following the example for which our goal is to maximize the number
of clicks, we write Lt = −Ct. Notice that we don’t put any regularization
parameter because we don’t put any constraints on the base bids, so far. Now,
we need to express the number of clicks as a function of the bids and then use
gradient descent to maximize the function. In practice, the function that we
use is:
Lt(bt) = −Ct(bt) = − St(bt)
CPCt(bt)
, (10)
where St(bt), and CPCt(bt) are, respectively, the total amount of money spent
and the resulting Cost Per Click in the previous epoch as a function of the base
bid, each element of the vectors representing a different media object. In line
of principle, the loss function should maximize the amount of money spent
while decreasing the CPC of each inventory piece. These two objectives are
contrasting: to spend more money one should increase the base bid to have
access to more inventory, but to buy cheap clicks one should reduce the base
bid.
In the following, we analyze separately the functions that appear on the
right hand side of (10), starting with the CPC. For sake of simplicity, since all
the bids act independently, we will just give the solution using scalar quantities.
The full result is presented at the end of the section and is also resumed in
Figure 4.
5.1. The analysis of the CPC
The CPC can be rewritten as:
CPCt =
CPMt
1 000 CTRt
, (11)
where CPM is the average Cost Per Mille, that is, the average price to pay
for a thousand impressions, and CTR is the Click-Through Rate that we have
already introduced.
First of all, we assume the CTR to be independent of the base bid and we
estimate it from the market data as:
CTRt =
Ct
Nt
, (12)
where Nt is the number of impressions bought and Ct are the clicks. The
assumption of independence is justified by the fact that, if the media object
filters are accurately set, all elements that are accessible by a single media
object should be equally valuable. Also, a correlation between CTR and bid
would mean that there is a general consensus on what is the most promising
impression to buy no matter the campaign advertisers are running. The truth,
as usual, lies in the middle: There is a certain correlation between CTR and
12
Algorithm for setting the base bid
1: function base bid setting
. Nt: number of impressions bought
. Bt: allocated budget
. St: money actually spent
. Ct: clicks obtained
. bt: base bid
. β: median winning bid over all the inventory
. τ : under-delivery threshold
. α: learning rate
. ub: upper bound on the bid
. lb: lower bound on the bid
. Bmin: minimal tolerance for zero budget
2: procedure calculate gradient of loss function
3: if Bt < Bmin then
4: ∇L(bt)← 0 . If no budget is set, ignore the media object.
5: else if St = 0 then
6: ∇L(bt)← −1/α . If no money is spent, increase the bid.
7: else
8: ∇Lt(bt)← −Ct· Nt1 000 St
{
β
bt+β
θ
(
τ − StBt
)
− βbt
[
1− βbt ln
(
1 + btβ
)]}
9: procedure apply Nadam to update the bids(see Figure 5)
10: procedure bound the bids in the correct interval
11: bt+1 ← max (lb, bt+1)
12: bt+1 ← min (bt+1, ub)
13: return bt+1
Figure 4: Algorithm for setting the base bid
Nadam algorithm
1: function Nadam
Require: αt;µt, µt+1; ν; ; . Hyperparameters
Require: mt;nt; . first/second moment vectors from the previous iteration
Require: bt;gt; . bids and gradient of the loss function
2: mt+1 ← µtmt + (1− µt)gt
3: nt+1 ← νtnt + (1− νt)g2t
4: mˆ← µt+1mt
1−∏t+1i=0 µi + (1− µt)gt1−∏ti=0 µi
5: nt+1 ← νtnt/(1− νt)
6: bt+1 ← bt − αt√
nt + 
mt
7: return bt+1
Figure 5: One iteration of Nadam, adapted from [8]
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bid, but in absence of better methods to estimate it we neglect it. Introducing
it in later improvements of the method will only require adding a term to the
bid loss function.
We now have to find the CPM. Following [30], let us assume that the prob-
ability of winning an auction with a base bid of b is given by an expression of
the form:
P (b) =
b
b+ β
, (13)
where β is the median winning bid over all the inventory (since bidding β gives
a 50% probability of winning).
We can define a probability density function:
p(b) =
dP (b)
db
=
β
(b+ β)
2 , (14)
that gives the percentage of inventory whose winning bid is exactly b.
RTB auctions often employ a second-price model to enforce truthful bidding
[26, 20, 9]. In such a situation, and remembering that the bid is typically
expressed in total offer per thousand impressions, the CPM is given by:
CPMt =
∫ bt
0
x p(x) dx∫ bt
0
p(x) dx
= βt
[(
1 +
βt
bt
)
ln
(
1 +
bt
βt
)
− 1
]
. (15)
We can notice the logarithmic increase of the average CPM at infinite bids
representing competitors placing extremely high bids to acquire inventory, a
strategy that gets rarer and rarer with increasing bids. From Equation 15 we
can estimate the value of the parameter βt by comparing the estimated value
of the CPM with the actual CPM returned from the market during that epoch.
The CPC as a function of all the basic quantities of the problem then reads:
CPCt =
Nt
1 000 Ct
· βt
[(
1 +
βt
bt
)
ln
(
1 +
bt
βt
)
− 1
]
. (16)
To obtain the derivative of the CPC part of the loss function we thus need only
derive the CPM in (15). Calculations lead to:
dCPMt
dbt
=
βt
bt
[
1− βt
bt
ln
(
1 +
bt
βt
)]
; (17)
dCPCt
dbt
=
Nt
1 000 Ct
βt
bt
[
1− βt
bt
ln
(
1 +
bt
βt
)]
. (18)
5.2. The analysis of the amount of money spent
In Equation 13 we have made an assumption about the probability of winning
an auction based on the base bid bt that is well evidenced. We can try to
leverage this assumption to find a relationship between bt and St. Let us divide
our discussion in two parts: The case of under-delivery and the case of correct
delivery.
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In the case of under-delivery, a media object buys the entire inventory that is
available to it (because if more was available, it would buy it with the remaining
money). This quantity can be estimated with
Nt(bt) = Itot,t · P (bt), (19)
where Itot is the total amount of inventory that would be available with an
infinite bid. The total money spent is then given exactly by:
St =
Itot,t
1 000
∫ bt
0
p(x)x dx (20)
=
Itot,t
1 000
βt
[
ln
(
1 +
bt
βt
)
− bt
bt + βt
]
,
where the factor 1 000 comes from the fact that the bid are expressed in offer
per thousand impressions.
The derivative of (20) with respect to the bid is given by:
dSt
dbt
=
Itot,t
1 000
bt · βt
(bt + βt)
2 =
Nt
1 000
βt
bt + βt
. (21)
We could have found the first equality also applying the fundamental theorem of
calculus to (20), while the second equality comes from the substitution Itot,t =
Nt(bt)/P (bt) (see Equation 19) which does not depend on the base bid bt because
the dependences of Nt and P cancel each other.
In case of good delivery, instead, some pieces of inventory are not bought
by the media object. A change in the base bid would most probably modify
the number of such pieces of inventory but won’t change the total amount of
money spent. Therefore, in this case, St is constant with respect to bt and its
derivative is 0.
In order to discriminate between the two delivery regimes, we use a Heaviside
step function θ
(
τ − StBt
)
, where τ is an under-delivery threshold, typically set
to 0.95 and not to 1 because a small amount of under-delivery is inherent to the
discreteness of the problem.
5.3. Proposed loss function and gradient
We can now give the gradient with respect to the bids of the loss function
Lt proposed in (10). It reads:
∇Lt(bt) = −Ct
(
1
St
dSt
dbt
− 1
CPCt
dCPCt
dbt
)
, (22)
which, with the results found so far, becomes
∇Lt(bt) = −Ct · Nt
1 000 St
× (23)
×
{
βt
bt + βt
θ
(
τ − St
Bt
)
− βt
bt
[
1− βt
bt
ln
(
1 +
bt
βt
)]}
.
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We notice that this equation is always well-defined, except when St = 0.
This can happen in two situations: either there is no budget assigned to the
strategy, in which case we impose no changes to be made since they would have
no effect anyway; or there is a budget assigned but the strategy doesn’t manage
to spend anything, in which case we are probably seriously underbidding and
we fix the value of the gradient to be negative.
With this loss function, we perform a Nadam gradient descent [8, 15] and
then bound the result to be in between a minimal and a maximal bid set by the
client. Unlike in budget partitioning, we choose an additive gradient descent
because we don’t need any normalization.
As a last remark on the base bid setting, there is currently a resurgence
in first price auctions. Our method is still applicable even in this situation,
provided a few changes are made to the form of the equations. In particular,
(15) and (20) would read respectively:
CPMt = bt; (24)
St =
Itot,t
1 000
bt
∫ bt
0
p(x) dx, (25)
giving rise to different, but nevertheless well-defined update rules.
Recently, another research paper that deals with the bidding algorithm was
published [23]. While there are similarities between their approach and ours,
we chose to maximize directly the number of clicks instead of defining another
utility function that needs other hyperparameters such as the monetary value
of each click. Moreover, the method we propose in this paper does not need to
have one data point per impression (an information that we assume is not at
our disposal) but only the average over a certain period of time.
6. skott: Pacing control
The third and last sub-routine is the one that controls the delivery ratio.
It checks that the total amount of money spent in the campaign so far follows
the desired profile. If that’s not the case, it increases the total budget available
for the next epoch. Notice that our goal is not to determine what is the best
delivery profile of the campaign over time, but only to stick to it as well as
possible. This sub-routine is the simplest one since it only sets a single scalar
parameter, unlike the previous two who sets a vectorial one.
Typically, advertisers want to control exactly how much money they spend
during the campaign. For example, the simplest delivery profile is the uniform
one, where the ideal amount of money spent until t is equal to the total budget
of the campaign times the fraction of the campaign that has elapsed already.
However, the money that was really spent on the market doesn’t always cor-
respond to the desired amount: unforeseen technical issues, fluctuations in the
available inventory, sudden changes in the properties of the market; they all can
contribute to a variation in the amount of money spent, typically resulting in
under-delivery.
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Algorithm for pacing control
1: function pacing control
. t: the current epoch
. T − t: epochs left
. St: actual spent until t
. S¯t: ideal spent until t
. B¯t+1: ideal budget for the next epoch
. η: aggressiveness parameter
2: ∆St ← S¯t − St
3: ∆Bt+1 ← η ·∆St/(T − t)
4: Bt+1 ← B¯t+1 + ∆Bt+1
5: return Bt+1
Figure 6: Algorithm for pacing control
Before the budget partitioning and base bid setting sub-routines can react
to the under-delivery and adapt their parameters, the actual delivery of the
campaign will have lost ground to the ideal one. It is desirable then to take
some measures in order to catch up with the ideal spent as soon as possible.
The hourly budget Bt+1 set by the algorithm looks like this:
Bt+1 = B¯t+1 + ∆Bt+1, (26)
∆Bt+1 = η
T − t
(S¯t − St) , (27)
where B¯t+1 is the ideal hourly budget, S¯t and St are respectively the ideal and
actual amount of money spent until epoch t, T − t is the number of epochs left,
and 1 ≤ η ≤ T − t is the aggressiveness parameter. If the aggressiveness is set
to 1, the algorithm tries to evenly spread the correction over the rest of the
campaign. Surprisingly, this is not good: the reason is that a small amount of
under-delivery is very common and it won’t be contrasted fast enough, imposing
a money rush toward the end of the campaign. Also, we typically want to
regain the ideal spend curve at a higher speed. However, too large a value of
aggressiveness is not desirable either, because it could mean a very large sudden
injection of money, possibly reducing the quality of our inventory and breaking
the simple assumptions we had to make to construct a model. We typically
choose values between 2 and 20.
A schematic view of the algorithm is presented in Figure 6.
7. Experimental results
We tested our algorithm on a simulated environment. (More on the char-
acteristics of the market simulator in Appendix A.) We will show the results
as follows: First we will compare different budget partitioning algorithms while
keeping no optimization on the base bids or on the pacing. Then, we will com-
pare base bid setting algorithms on top of the budget partitioning we presented
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Figure 7: The evolution of the budget partitioning for 10 media objects, according to the four
different algorithms we test, taken over a single run of the optimization. The solid lines show
a smoothed version of the dotted lines for better visualization.
Table 1: Optimization Results for Budget Partitioning
algo spt clk cpc kld
vnl 91.2 % 100.0 % 0.990 0.000
mab 91.0 % 102.6 % 0.979 0.005
lop 84.5 % 137.7 % 0.664 0.503
skt1 96.2 % 132.5 % 0.785 0.095
in this paper. Finally, we will show the advantages of introducing the pac-
ing control algorithm on top of the budget partitioning and base bid setting
algorithm we chose.
7.1. The comparison of budget partitioning algorithms
We compared our algorithm to three other algorithms: (1) A vanilla al-
gorithm (codenamed vnl) that does absolutely nothing. (2) A multi-armed
bandit algorithm inspired by [1, 3], codenamed mab. (3) A linear optimization
algorithm inspired by [5], codenamed lop, that maximizes the clicks under the
constraints of the total available budget and an interval of admitted budgets for
every media object. More information about these algorithms can be found in
Appendix D.
Figure 7 gives the comparisons of these algorithms. We present a simulation
with day parting, i.e., with a different algorithm running for each hour of the
day. The total number of epochs is 30, the number of days in a month. The
first thing we want to point out is that lop is quite greedy, as we expected,
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Figure 8: The four metrics we use to evaluate the algorithms: money spent, clicks obtained,
CPC, and divergence from the uniform distribution as obtained from an average of 20 op-
timizations on different randomly chosen starting points. The solid lines show a smoothed
version of the dotted lines for better visualization.
while mab is almost like vnl. This is due to the fact that only one media object
per epoch is updated, giving just 30 small kicks to the initial situation. Our
proposed algorithm, skt1, seems to strike in between: It moves quickly without
becoming greedy.
To quantify this result, we measure greediness by calculating the KL-divergence
[17] of the proposed budget repartition with respect to the uniform distribution
u. The KL-divergence is a widely used method: for example, in reinforcement
learning, it measures the distance between two policies, i.e., two different courses
of action that optimize a given reward [2, 25, 22]. It is defined as:
∆(w,u) =
∑
i
wi log
(
wi
ui
)
. (28)
A value of ∆(w,u) = 0 means that the distribution of the weights is exactly
the same as u. On the other hand, the maximal value is obtained by a greedy
distribution w
(i)
g where one of the elements is 1 and all the others are 0. In this
case, the KL-divergence measures log(K). The values in the lower right plot of
Figure 8 are values of KL-divergence rescaled by a factor log(K), so that they
are always constrained between 0 and 1 independently of the number of media
objects.
These qualitative discussions find their quantitative conclusions in Figure 8
and in Table 1: The first column of numerical values (spt) represents the per-
centage of the initial budget that was spent, the second (clk) the additional
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Table 2: Optimization Results for Base Bid and Pacing.
algo spt clk cpc kld
skt1 96.2 % 100.0 % 0.785 0.095
skt1 + pst 90.2 % 136.9 % 0.538 0.071
skt1 + skt2 84.8 % 231.0 % 0.300 0.086
skt1 + skt2 + skt3 99.8 % 251.6 % 0.324 0.085
clicks in percent with respect to the vnl algorithm, the third (cpc) the total
CPC of the campaign, and the fourth (kld) the distance of the budget reparti-
tion from the uniform distribution.
If one considers only the total number of assigned clicks as the metric to
measure the performance of the algorithms, lop wins over skt1 by a small
margin. Also, its total calculated CPC is slightly lower, meaning that every click
costs less money. However, on the bottom right panel of Figure 8, we can see
how greedy lop is. This reflects on the total amount of money spent on the top
left panel: if the desired media object doesn’t have enough available inventory,
this algorithm can not react decisively. Nothing grants us that this situation
won’t happen in real life with even more damaging results, in particular, a severe
under-delivery of the budget. On the contrary, skt1 manages to spend almost
all the available budget (represented by the purple line) even without an explicit
optimization on the bid and the pacing. The increased adaptability makes it
more resistant to the real market test and thus more valuable.
7.2. The rest of the analysis
We now choose the skt1 algorithm for the budget partitioning and study
the effect of different base bid setters. This time, we compare the new skt2
algorithm to other two algorithms: again vnl where bids are not changed, and
also pst, an algorithm that uses a predetermined set of rules. We also add in the
analysis the comparison of skt2 on top of skt1 with the full skott algorithm,
which also contains the pacing control sub-routine.
Let us explain first a little bit about pst. The predetermined set of rules
analyzes the CPC first: if it is higher than a certain goal set at the beginning
of the campaign, the bid is reduced by a certain fixed multiplicative constant
unless the media object is under-delivering. In that case pst will still try to
slightly increase the bid. We can see many inconveniences in this approach
compared to the algorithm we presented in Section 5: first of all we need an
additional external parameter, that is, the goal CPC. Furthermore, it makes
very little use of the data from the market, reducing the adaptability.
These limitations have an effect on the results, as can be seen from Figure 10
and from Table 2. Differently from before, the baseline for the column (clk) is
now skt1 and not vnl. The skt2 algorithm manages to outperform both vnl
and pst by a vast amount, obtaining a larger number of clicks while spending
less money.
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Figure 9: The evolution of the base bid for 10 media objects, according to the four different
algorithms we test, taken over a single run of the optimization. The solid lines show a smoothed
version of the dotted lines for better visualization.
Figure 10: Same as Figure 8, but for the base bid setting algorithms. The solid lines show a
smoothed version of the dotted lines for better visualization.
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From the top left corner of Figure 10 one can see that the amount of money
spent oscillates quite a bit at the beginning of our proposed algorithm. We
see this stems from a similar oscillation in the algorithm’s attempts to find
the appropriate bids, as can be seen from Figure 9: the peaks of money spent
correspond to bids slightly higher than the optimal and vice versa. Finally, we
see that adding the third and last part of the algorithm manages to spend almost
the entire initial budget, obtaining a small increase in clicks at the expense of a
slightly higher CPC.
It is interesting to notice that the last plot, containing the KL-divergence,
shows that the budget repartition changes slightly depending on which bidding
algorithm we choose. This is understandable because, by changing the base bid,
we actually modify the perceived quality of the media object and thus generate
different inputs for the different iterations of the budget partitioning algorithm.
However, these modifications are small enough to be neglected at first order.
8. Conclusion
We have introduced a method for advertisers to optimize the management
of Demand Side Platforms when running an advertising campaign composed of
many separate media objects. The method, that we call skott algorithm, is
an iterative method that makes only a few general assumptions on the mathe-
matical model of the market. We present it here applied to a campaign for the
optimization of the number of generated clicks.
The skott algorithm is composed of three complementary parts: Firstly,
the best partitioning for the budget across all media objects is calculated. This
is achieved by estimating the quality of each media object and trying to ob-
tain the maximum number of clicks through an exponentiated gradient descent
method. Second, the best base bid for each media object is calculated. Here
we use the assumption and corresponding evidence from [30] that relates the
bid to the probability of winning the corresponding auction. We expand on
this assumption to propose a model relating variation in bids to variation in
the number of clicks obtained by each media object. We finally apply a Nadam
technique [8, 15] on the market data to find the best base bids for maximizing
the number of clicks. The third and last part determines the amount of budget
to use at every epoch in order to stay as close as possible to the desired spend
profile.
The proposed algorithm has been tested on a simulated environment that
we created for the occasion and that we present in the appendices. Under
these circumstances, the proposed algorithm gives impressive results, more than
doubling the total amount of obtained clicks in the considered experiments.
Appendix A. Model of the market
We created a back-test platform for analyzing different campaign manage-
ment algorithms. The work-flow of the platform is conceptually divided in five
steps:
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1. Parameters are chosen that describe the problem we have at hand.
2. Data is created using these parameters.
3. Loss functions are chosen.
4. All algorithms are launched independently. They work on the same data
and their goal is to maximize the total number obtained during the cam-
paign.
5. The results of the different algorithms are compared: we plot budget repar-
tition, base bids, greediness of the algorithms, cumulative CPC, spend
profiles, and collected clicks over time.
In this section, we will discuss the first two steps, that relate to the creation of
the back-test platform itself. Step 3 and 4 are discussed in Section 4, 5, and 6
of the main body of the article, while some plots of the results are presented in
section 7.
Appendix A.1. Choice of the parameters
There are just a few important parameters for the problem. They can be
chosen independently, but the quality of the output policy heavily depends on
their interaction. These parameters are:
• The total number of epochs T . This is fixed by the length of the campaign
and by the duration the data batches. Since we consider hourly data and
a campaign lasts for one month, we typically work with T = 24∗30 = 720.
• The day parting boolean: If true, we only consider data that comes from
the same hour of the day, effectively launching 24 parallel algorithms and
reducing the number of epochs per algorithm by a factor of 24. The
reasons behind this are further explored in Appendix B.
• The number of media objects K. Typically, a larger K increases the
probability of having good media objects but also increases the cost of
exploration. The optimal number of media objects, therefore, depends on
the budget at our disposal.
• The CPCgoal, a business-driven parameter that says how much money the
advertiser wants to spend on average to get a click. We use this only for
the pst algorithm.
• The total campaign budget B or, equivalently, the average budget per
epoch per media object bem = B/(T ·K). In particular, there is a sort of
phase transition at the critical value bem = CPCgoal: Above that value,
all media objects should statistically be able to obtain at least one click
per epoch, making for efficient exploration even in the first epoch alone,
when no optimization has started yet. Below that, clicks become rare and
many epochs are needed to efficiently understand the relative quality of
the media objects.
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• The number of repetitions of the experiment, E. The process of deter-
mining the best algorithm heavily depends on the input data, which is
randomly generated. A single sample from a random generation might
have some characteristics that are more convenient for a particular algo-
rithm. Taking several samples of data and averaging the results of the
numerical calculations over all the samples reduces the impact of this er-
ror at the cost of a linear increase in computational time. Typically we
take E = 20.
Appendix A.2. Data creation
Data creation is handled by a Python class. Given the budgets Bt and the
base bids bt of all media objects for epoch t, it returns the impressions bought
Nt, the clicks obtained Ct, and the money spent St in that epoch for all media
objects. To make synthetic data closer to real data, the class is constructed to
mimic the structure of the market data we can access. Therefore, it takes as
an input a subset of the same parameters that we send to the market during
real-life campaigns. Also the output is made of a subset of the same results we
obtain from the market in real life.
The underlying model of the market is exactly the same as described in
section 5. For the creation of data, we generate the CTRs, the total inventory
available on the market Itot, and the median winning bids β separately for each
media object, sampling from appropriate intervals uniformly at random. Then
we use (15) to calculate the average CPM of the media objects as a function of
their bids, bt. With all this, we can find out how many impressions each media
object will buy at epoch t by using:
Nt = min
(
1 000 Bt
CPMt
, Itot,t ·P(bt)
)
, (A.1)
where the first element is the number of impressions one would buy with infinite
available inventory, and the second one is the total available pieces of inventory
with bid bt.
We finally use the equation:
St = Nt · CPMt
1 000
(A.2)
to find out how much money each the media object spent and, consequently,
how much it under-delivered.
Once the purchase of impressions is done, the market simulator assigns the
clicks by sampling from a binomial distribution with probability of positive
outcome given by the CTR of each media object.
The market simulator allows for a certain amount of control on the variation
over time of the quality of the media objects, since all the quantities we generate
can be modified at any epoch. This is a very important feature of the data: a
model with static media objects tends to select algorithms that don’t explore,
while dynamic media objects require exploration to keep track of the changing
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environment. Different time dependencies, therefore, lead to different best al-
gorithms. More details about sources of periodicity can be found in Appendix
B.
Appendix B. Dealing with time variations
As already mentioned in Appendix A, there can be variations in the quality
of media objects with time. While the causes are various, the main effect is the
double periodicity induced by the day-night cycle and the weekly cycle [27]. In
particular, there is a big drop in the volume of impressions dealt and the number
of clicks at night that often leads advertisers to forgo buying impressions at these
times.
But variations are not always periodic, nor globally affecting all the media
objects at the same time. A change in the relative quality of the media objects
can happen over time due to external factors. A typical example could be a
media object advertising a live event: the distance in time from the day of the
event is an important parameter for users to decide whether to buy a ticket.
Finally, some changes might be due to correlations not considered in our
model. For example, a change in the base bid that we offer during auctions
might lead to a modification of the CTR of the impressions we are able to buy.
The solution we take in order to deal with such issues is to launch 24 different
algorithms, one for every hour. The advantage is clear: in case some media
objects are turned off at a certain moment of the day, they won’t affect the
perceived quality of the media object during other hours. However, there are
obvious disadvantages as well: we discard data that might still give valuable
information and convergence is 24 times slower.
For the aperiodic modifications over time, we want to have fast responses
to the changes in the market. Since information on the changes is obtained
through the purchase of impressions, we try to keep the algorithm as far from
greedy as possible while still increasing the number of obtained clicks.
Appendix C. Data pre-processing
In the real world, when we receive the data, there are often missing values
that need to be filled before starting the optimization. Here, we fill the missing
values using a combination of three different approaches: a) backward filling;
where we propagate the next valid observation, b) linear interpolation method;
which is a method of curve fitting using linear polynomials to construct the
missing values, and c) weighted moving averaging approach; which is an aver-
aging that has multiplying factors to give different weights to data points at
different positions.
Let x = [x1, x2, nan, x4, ..., xt, nan, ..., nan] be of assumed length τ . As
one can see, there are some nans before epoch t, and a series of nans between t
and τ . In the case of having some missing values at the beginning of the vector,
we fill the nans using the backward filling method. For instance, [nan, xi, xj ]
gives [xi, xi, xj ].
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Next, we fill the nans up to epoch t using a linear interpolate method. As
a result, there will be no missing values between the epochs 1 and t.
Last, we fill the nans between the epoch t and τ using a weighted moving
averaging approach. Let us consider x’ = [x1, ..., xt, nan, ..., nan], where for all
1 ≤ i ≤ t, xi 6= nan, and for all t+ 1 ≤ i ≤ τ , xi = nan. To do so, we consider
a weight vector in the filling process. In an t-index weighted moving average,
the latest data point has weight t, the second latest t − 1, . . . , terminating at
one. Therefore, the estimation of data point t+ 1 is defined as:
xt+1 =
(1 · x1 + 2 · x2 + ...+ (t− 1) · xt−1 + t · xt)
(t · (t+ 1)/2) (C.1)
All the missing values xi for t+ 1 ≤ i ≤ τ are filled using (C.1).
Appendix D. A quick glance at the competing algorithms
In section 7 we mention three algorithms that we use as a comparison against
our own. The vnl algorithm needs no explanation, because it corresponds to a
non-optimized campaign in which the initial parameters are kept constant. On
the other hand, mab and lop deserve a few words, which we will spend in the
next paragraphs.
Appendix D.1. The multi-armed bandit algorithm
The Multi-Armed Bandit problem (MAB) deals with an agent (that is, who-
ever or whatever is able to take an action, such as a person or a robot) which, at
definite time moments t known as epochs, is faced with a number K of possible
different actions, each leading to a different reward. The goal is typically to find
the course of actions, also called a policy, that maximizes the received reward.
The difficulty of the problem is that the rewards are not known in advance and
can be stochastic; a certain number of trials is necessary in order to explore the
system before understanding what is the optimal policy to exploit.
The exploration-exploitation dichotomy is at the heart of all multi-armed
bandit algorithms: the information acquired during the trials comes at the cost
of exploring unknown actions that might lead to poor immediate rewards.
Stochasticity in a policy assures the exploration: therefore, it is needed at
the beginning and is often reduced over time to ensure eventual convergence to
the best action. This is no longer valid when the rewards change over time: In
that case, the exploration is always needed to keep track of the moving averages.
Mathematically speaking, the MAB is defined by a tuple 〈A,R〉, where A is
the set of all possible actions the agent can take and R is the set of the rewards
associated with those actions. The policy pi is a probability distribution over A:
The next action is chosen by sampling over the policy pi.
In our case, we want to choose the best media object to bid with on incoming
inventory items. The K actions inside A correspond to “choose media object
1”, ..., “choose media object K”. However, the agent that chooses the action
to perform is a bidding algorithm that is not directly under our control. The
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only thing we can influence is the distribution of the results: If, for example,
we want to enact a policy for which media object 1 should be preferred 80%
of times (exploitation) and all the others should be equally distributed among
the remaining 20% (exploration), we can set the budget associated to every
policy accordingly. Since a media object can not place a bid unless it has
enough available budget, this effectively forces the desired average behavior
over a certain time period.
A second difference with the standard MAB problem relates to the informa-
tion we have access to. We don’t have access to all the information given to the
bidding algorithm, but only to aggregate information on winning impressions
every hour, therefore, to the average reward of every media object at every
epoch. However, this is strictly related to our inability to access the bid itself
and doesn’t introduce any additional constraint.
In spite of these differences, we can still create an algorithm based on the
multi-armed bandit problem. To do so, we follow the algorithm exp3 as pre-
sented in [1], copied in Figure D.11 for convenience.
Budget partitioning with exp3
1: function Exp3 budget partitioning
. γ: real number ∈ (0, 1]
2: procedure Initialization
3: wi(1) = 1 for i = 1, ...,K
4: procedure Budget repartitioning
5: for t = 1, 2... do
6: pi(t)← (1− γ) wi(t)∑K
j=1 wj(t)
+
γ
K
i = 1, ...,K
7: draw it randomly accordingly to the probabilities p1(t), ..., pK(t).
8: receive reward Rit(t) ∈ [0, 1)
9: for j = 1, ..., J do
xˆj(t)←
{
Ri(t)/pj(t) if j = it,
0 otherwise
(D.1)
wj(t+ 1)← wj(t) exp
(
γ xˆj(t)
K
)
(D.2)
Figure D.11: The exp3 algorithm as presented in [1].
The reward function we choose is:
R =
|x|
1 + |x| , x =
C
Cgoal
∗ CPCgoal
CPC
, (D.3)
where C is a vector of clicks and the goal (in terms of clicks) is given by the
maximum of the running exponential average of the number of clicks obtained
by the media object and the ratio between the allotted budget and the goal
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CPC. This reward has been chosen because we value media objects that have
low cost per goal and attract many clicks. We don’t use the variable x as a
reward because we prefer to work with rewards bounded between 0 and 1.
Notice that this algorithm, while certainly offering improvements over the
vnl algorithm, is only using a fraction of all the information that we have since,
conforming to the possibility of a real MAB problem, it uses the reward of a
single media object at every epoch.
Appendix D.2. The linear programming algorithm
The problem of collecting the largest possible number of clicks can be writ-
ten as an optimization under some linear constraints. In particular, we try to
maximize the number of clicks under the (external) constraint of the total bud-
get and a (self-imposed) constraint on the amount of variation of the budget
per each epoch.
Linear programming algorithm for budget partitioning
1: function Linear optimization budget partitioning
. CPC: an estimation of the CPC of each media object
. B˜t: the remaining budget in the campaign
. l: the lower bounds to the budget per media object
. u: the upper bounds to the budget per media object
2: procedure budget partitioning
3: R← B˜t . the remaining budget to allocate
4: B← l . all media objects get at least the minimum allowed
5: R← R−∑iBi . start reducing the remaining budget
6: idx← indices that sort CPC in descending order
7: for i in idx do
8: ai ← min(R, ui − li) . additional money to allocate to Bi
9: Bi ← Bi + ai
10: R← R− ai
11: return B
Figure D.12: Linear programming algorithm for budget partitioning
Let’s assign to the variables B ∈ RK the budgets of the K media objects.
The function to maximize is:
f(x) = cᵀ ·B, (D.4)
where c = 1/CPC is a vector of coefficients that relates the budget to the
expected number of clicks. The vector CPC is estimated from real market data
with the formulas:
Sˆt = St + γSˆt−1, Cˆt = Ct + γCˆt−1, (D.5)
CPCt =
Sˆt
Cˆt
, (D.6)
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where St and Ct are respectively the vector of the total money spent and the
the total clicks gathered at a certain epoch t. The values Sˆ and Cˆ are initialized
at zero when t = 0 and γ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor (see Section 4 for more
details on the discount factor).
The constraints can be written in the form:
A ∗B ≤ v, A ∈ R(2k + 1, k), v ∈ R(2k + 1). (D.7)
The matrix A has only ones in the first row followed by two K × K diagonal
matrices containing respectively only −1 and only 1. The vector v, instead,
contains the remaining budget B˜t as the first element followed by the 2K bounds
to the budget to be assigned to each media object: The first K are the lower
bounds li,t (with a minus sign in front to reverse the direction of the inequality)
while the second K are the upper bounds ui,t. For example, in the case K = 3,
they read:
A =

1 1 1
−1 0 0
0 −1 0
0 0 −1
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

, v =

B˜t
−l0,t
−l1,t
−l2,t
u0,t
u1,t
u2,t

(D.8)
The values of the lower and upper bounds control are set as following:
li,t+1 = αl · Si,t, ui,t+1 = αu · Si,t, (D.9)
where αl < 1 and αu > 1. These two quantities control how much variation is
possible to introduce between epochs and are therefore related to the learning
rate of the algorithm.
The solution to this system can be found analytically and is presented in
Figure D.12. It is important to notice that, in case the estimation of the CPC
is sufficiently constant, this algorithm converges exponentially to the greedy
solution. However, in our back-test simulations, stochasticity in the market and
the use of the discount factor γ > 0 imply a fluctuation in the relative order of
preference for the media object based on their CPC, which in turn leads to a
behavior that is - at least partly - exploratory.
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